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ABSTRACT.  An individual's rate of time preference is an important consideration for 
individuals deciding whether to support a public good since the benefits of a public good 
often come in the future. Our study finds individual discount rates from a contingent 
valuation method (CVM) question where the time frame of the payment schedule is varied 
across surveys.  We find discount rates similar to the rates found in the recent revealed 
preference and experimental literature of around 30%. Our CVM question addresses the 
preservation of additional open space adjacent to a large regional park at the urban fringe of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the benefits and costs of a public good are often spread over time, discount rates 
are necessary  for the calculation of the present  value of those future streams to evaluate 
whether to create a public good. We determine a household's individual discount rate with the 
contingent  valuation  method  (CVM)  using  payment  schedules  that  extend  for  different 
lengths of time. 
A rate of time preference, or individual discount rate, is a subjective interpretation of 
how a person compares value in their future to value available to them today, presumably by 
discounting. 
The discount rates popularly used in welfare analysis, similar to market discount rates, 
(roughly between 3 percent and 10 percent) are much lower than the individual discount rates 
typically found in the literature. Although no completely satisfying explanation exists for the 
discrepancy  between  market  and  individual  discount  rates,  a  common  explanation  is 
transaction costs. The transaction costs of borrowing money  at market rates  for sporadic 
every  day  purchases  is  too  high  to  equalize  market  and  individual  discount  rates.  For 
instance, American consumers often pay credit card companies far in excess of the market 
rate return (Ausubel 1991). 
The purpose of this paper is to find individual discount rates in a stated preference 
framework  with  a  double-bounded  contingent  valuation  question.  Knowledge  of  how 
respondents discount future benefits in a stated preference framework will help researchers 
better understand the value of non-market commodities. 
Rates of time preference have been identified by revealed preference (Hausman 1979; 
Gately 1980; Ruderman, Levine, and McMahon 1986), experimental (Thaler 1981; Benzion, 
Rapoport,  and  Yagil  1989;  Harrison,  Lau,  and  William  2002),  and  stated  preference 
techniques (Stevens, DeCoteau, and Willis 1997; Crocker and Shogren 1993).  Hausman's (   4
1979) study of consumer tradeoffs between the purchase price and delayed energy payments 
for air conditioners found a rate of about 25 percent. Gately (1980) and also Ruderman et al. 
(1986) compute rates of time preference for different appliances such as space and water 
heater, air conditioners, and refrigerators and freezers. The discount rates depend heavily on 
the kind of appliance ranging from 17 percent for air conditioners to 243 percent for electric 
water heaters.  More recently, Ausubel (1991) notes that nearly three quarters of people do 
not pay their credit card balances on time, and finds that the finance charges from not paying 
off the credit card balances translate into a 19 percent discount rate.  Also, Warner et al. 
(2001) find that enlisted military personnel, offered voluntary separation options by a lump-
sum payment or an annuity, had discount rates between 35 and 54 percent. 
Thaler (1981) and Benzion et al. (1989) use experiments to ask respondents to decide 
between taking money now or waiting until later to receive a larger amount. The discount rate 
is shown to depend on the length of the wait and the magnitude of the money to be received, 
both result in lower discount rates.  If the respondent is losing rather than receiving money, 
the discount rate is also lower.  The discount rates from these experiments largely range from 
20 to 35 percent.  Most recently, Harrison (2002) uses surveys and experiments to estimate 
individual discount rates in Denmark.  Discount rates, which range mostly from 25 to 30 
percent, are shown to depend on demographic characteristics of the respondent and to a lesser 
extent on the length of the time horizon. 
Crocker and Shogren (1993) uses CVM to elicit discount rates from willingness to pay 
questions regarding the length of wait times at ski resorts.  Their paper is a first attempt at 
finding a rate of time preference for an environmental good, but the two-step approach of first 
finding willingness to pay (WTP) and next identifying the discount rate from those WTPs 
does not require respondents to think about the benefits of an environmental good over time. 
Stevens  et  al.  (1997)  finds  discount  rates  from  willingness  to  pay  questions  for  salmon   5
restoration and weekly movie passes.  Their similar two step process is problematic since 
discount rate are inferred from statistical WTPs as opposed to directly from questions in the 
survey.  Discount rates from their question about salmon restoration range from 50 to 270 
percent. 
Our study uses a double-bounded dichotomous choice WTP question where, in addition 
to variation in bids across surveys, there is variation in length of the payment schedule across 
surveys.  Since respondents confront a payment schedule in the bid offer for a public good, 
their rate of time preference is directly used in their mental calculation of whether to accept 
or reject the bid offer in a  way similar to the choices respondents make  in the revealed 
preference and experimental literature.  We show that the discount rate depends on the length 
of the payment schedule the respondent answers for the WTP question.  The shorter the 
length of the payment schedule the higher the discount rate. When information from all the 
payment schedules is used, discount rates of around 30 percent are found. 
Since the WTP question is double-bounded dichotomous choice, we estimate several 
models of WTP responses to account for shift, anchoring, and framing effects (Herriges and 
Shogren  1996;  Alberini,  Kanninen,  and  Carson  1997;  Whitehead  2002;  DeShazo  2002; 
Flachaire and Hollard 2006). We find there is some sensitivity of the discount rate to these 
different models of WTP responses with the model better specified when accounting for the 
shift, anchoring and framing effects. 
Our CVM question is designed for the measurement of the value of additional public 
open space in Portland, Oregon. We propose an increase  in the size, by 100 acres, of a 
prominent regional park at the city boundary of Portland by purchasing land adjacent to the 
park which would be made available to the public. Since the land adjacent to the park is 
currently  proposed  for  development,  the  policy  scenario  is  timely  and  credible  for  the 
residents of Portland receiving the survey.   6
A handful studies use stated preference techniques to find the value of general open 
space in urban areas. Breffle et al. (1998) use CVM to estimate the value of 5.5 acre parcel of 
undeveloped land in Boulder, Colorado. They find a median WTP of $234 to preserve the 
parcel where the WTP is increasing  in  income and decreasing  in distance.  Lindsey and 
Knapp (1999) assess the value of maintaining a section of a greenway in Indianapolis.  The 




Vaananen (1998) use CVM to find the WTP to prevent the development of small forested 
areas in Finland.  The mean WTP each year for three years ranges from $44-$47 where the 
WTP is shown to depend significantly on the use and view of the forested areas. 
Our study examines the WTP for an expansion of preserved public open space at the 
urban fringe.  There is very little understanding of the value people attach to open space at the 
urban fringe although this a controversial policy issue.  We find that the median WTP for an 
additional 100 acres in Portland, Oregon is around $165 in comparison to the median WTP of 
$234 found for a 5.5 acre parcel in Boulder, Colorado.  One explanation of this significant 
discrepancy is the concern raised by respondents about the need for additional open space 
nearby an already large 570 acre regional park.  Also, in the Breffle et al. (1998) study, a 
strong advocacy group was behind the preservation of the open space. 
We find, similar to previous studies, that median WTP positively depends on income, 
but surprisingly the distance and travel time of the respondent from the new open space do 
not significantly explain WTP.  We speculate that for a prominent regional park the public in 
all parts of the city feel that changes in the park affect them, even if use of the park is never 
intended, indicating that existence or bequest values may be a significant portion of the WTP. 
Another possibility is that, since all the respondents live in the Portland-area, there may be 
inadequate variation in the distance and travel time of the respondents to the new open space 
to obtain a significant relationship with WTP.  The strongest explanatory factors of WTP are   7
the education of the respondent, the size of their family, the number of weekly hours at work, 
the average amount of time spent on-site at regional parks in Portland, and the perception of 
the  quality  of  the  hiking  trails.  These  findings  suggest  that  educated outdoor  enthusiasts 
represent the principal supporters of regional parks in an urban area. 
We conclude the paper by illustrating the importance of individual discount rates for 
policy decisions. The level of the discount rate is shown to influence the finding of the full 
WTP for additional open space. In particular, a low monthly WTP and low discount rate 
results in a much higher full WTP than a high monthly WTP and a high discount rate. The 
individual discount rate is found to be sensitive to two demographic characteristics of the 
respondents, in particular, the age of the respondent and the presence of young children living 
in the same household as the respondent. 
Both those demographics are shown to have higher discount rates than the rest of the 
population, concerning the creation of additional open space. Cropper et al. (1994) find that 
those same demographic characteristics influence, in the same way, the discount rates for 
lives saved implicit in comparisons of life saving programs. Perhaps, for all public goods, 
those particular demographics  have  higher discount rates than the rest of the population. 
Policy makers should be aware of which demographics have higher discount rates (for what 
public goods) and thus, all else equal, less full benefits from a policy decision. 
 
II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The true WTP for each period,  0i W , by individual i for a public good providing an 
infinite stream of benefits is revealed by their response to two valuation questions.  The WTP 
for  answering  valuation  question  j  is,  , =1,2 ji W j .  The  follow-up  question  is  incentive 
compatible if  2 1 = i i W W , (i.e. the WTP of the follow-up question,  2i W , neither shifts nor is   8
anchored to the initial starting-point bid amount).  Assuming incentive compatibility, follow-
up questions reduces the variance of the WTP estimate without bias. 
The bid amount for the jth valuation question,  ( , ) ji i B r T , is the net present value of a 
finite  stream  of  bids  lasting  i T   periods,  where  the  bid  for  each  period  is  ji b ,  prior  to 
discounting by the rate of time preference, r . A ``yes'' response to the jth valuation question 















The form of the bid for the public good is a payment schedule represented by a finite 
stream of bids,  ji b , beginning next period and lasting  i T  periods. Since the stream of bids 
occurs in the future, the individual discounts the  ji b  to the present according to their rate of 
time  preference,  r.  The  net  present  value  of  the  finite  stream  of  bids from the payment 
schedule is the bid amount  ( , ) ji i B r T . 
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The literature has developed several methods to control for violations of the assumption   9
of  incentive  compatibility  (Herriges  and  Shogren  1996;  Alberini,  Kanninen,  and  Carson 
1997; Whitehead 2002; DeShazo 2002; Flachaire and Hollard 2006). These methods include 
controlling for shift, anchoring, and framing effects, along with any combination of these 
effects, occurring in double-bounded stated preference questions. The shift, anchoring, and 
framing effects of WTP are defined by,  
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- +   (2) 
where  d  is the parameter for the shift,  0 1 g £ £  is the parameter for the anchoring, and 
1 = 0 i r  if the individual's response to the first bid amount is ``no". 
A  shift  effect  (Alberini,  Kanninen,  and  Carson  1997)  has  different  interpretations 
depending on the sign of d . A negative value for d  indicates ``nea-saying" behavior where 
an individual reduces their WTP because, when presented with a higher bid amount, they feel 
they are being asked to pay more unnecessarily for a public good, or, when presented with a 
lower bid amount, they feel they are being asked to pay for a lower quality public good.  A 
positive  value for  d  indicates ``yea-saying" behavior where an  individual increases their 
WTP to acknowledge the proposition of the stated preference question. 
An anchoring effect (Herriges and Shogren 1996) exists if an individual's WTP to the 
follow-up question is a weighted combination of their original WTP and the first bid amount. 
The  value  of  g   ranges  from 0,  which  means  no  anchoring, to  1,  which means that the 
individual completely ignores their original WTP and replaces it with the first bid amount. 
The  framing  effect  (DeShazo  2002)  contends  that  the  violations  of  incentive 
compatibility occur only in ascending follow-up questions. The remedy is thus simply not to 
use the ascending follow-up questions.  Flaschaire and Hollard (2006) suggest a model to 
bring back the information from ascending follow-up questions.  See Flaschaire and Hollard   10
(2006) for details about the estimation and more description of shift, anchoring, and framing 
effects. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Suppose, once the public good is provided, the individual receives a benefit each period 
from the public good equal to their true willingness to pay per period for the public good, 
0i W .  Further suppose that the benefit an individual receives each period is constant over 
time, and an individual receives the benefit each period for an infinite number of periods.  If 
each period is short, the assumption of an infinite time horizon is reasonable for a finite lived 
individual receiving the benefits.  The assumption that the benefit is constant over time is also 
reasonable if any  decay that does occur only  takes places far  off  in the future. The  full 





The yes/no response to a valuation question depends on whether the full willingness to 
pay exceeds the bid amount,  
  

















The full willingness to pay differs across valuation questions for individual  i if shift, 
anchoring,  or  framing  effects  are  present.  Assuming  that  all  the  effects  are  present,  for 
=1,2 j  the empirical form of the full willingness to pay is,  
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where  1 = 0 D ,  2 =1 D  (for the valuation question  j  the respondent answers),  i X  is vector of 
covariates explaining an individual's willingness to pay,  1 = 0 i r   if the individual's response to 
the first bid amount is ``no", the parameters  , , , i r and T d g  are defined in the discussion of 
incentive compatibility, and  ji e  is an error term reflecting that there is error in the 
measurement of willingness to pay. 
Since each individual answers two valuation questions, the error term,  = ji i ji e m n + , is 
separated  into  an  error  component  common  to  the  individual,  , i m   and  a  random  error 
component,  ji n .  The error common to the individual,  , i m  accounts for the willingness to pay 
due to unobservable characteristics of the individual, which we assume for the analysis is 
normally distributed.  The random error component,  ji n , is a transitory normally distributed 
shock  different  for  each  valuation  question  =1,2 j   that  individual  i  answers.    The 
correlation coefficient, 
2 2 2 = /( ) m m n r s s s + , is the ratio of the variance of the individual error 
component to the total variance.  A large  r  suggests that the unobservable characteristics of 
the individual represents a significant component of the total variance, and a random effects 
model of the error term is appropriate (Alberini, Kanninen, and Carson 1997). 
Implementation of (3) is based on a random effects probit model, where the probability 
individual i responds ``yes" to the  j th question,  =1,2 j , is:  
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where s  is the scale parameter for the total variance.   12
Typically, by varying bid amounts across respondents, the scale parameter is directly 
identified from the coefficient on the bid amount.  However, since the bid amount is the net 
present value of a finite stream of bids discounted by an unknown rate of time preference, r, 
the direct identification of either the scale parameter or the rate of time preference is not 
possible since both are lumped together into the coefficient, 
( , ) i r T f
s
- , on the per period bid 
amount  ji b .  Nonetheless, with additional variation in the length of the payment schedule,  i T , 
across respondents, both the scale parameter and the rate of time preference can be identified. 
To illustrate the identification method, suppose there is variation in the length of the 
payment schedules, such that the payment schedules last for  ˆ, , T T
￿  and  T  periods. In that 
case,  the  coefficient  on  ji b   differs  based  upon  the  length  of  the  payment  schedule, 
ˆ ( , ) ( , )
,
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- . The ratio of any two of the coefficients results in the 
elimination of the scale parameter.  For instance, for the payment schedules lasting  , T
￿
 and  ˆ T  
periods, the ratio of the coefficients 
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.  To use the 
information contained in all the payment schedules, a ratio of coefficients is formed for a 
payment  schedule  of  each  different  length,  and  the  ratios  are  summed  together,  
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.   The standard error of each ratio, or the sum of the ratios, is obtained from 
the asymptotic covariance matrix by the Delta method (Greene 1997). 
While the coefficients on the bid amounts come directly from the estimation of the 
model  (4),  the  determination  of  r  from  the  ratio  of  the  coefficients  requires  numerical 
techniques separate from the original estimation.  Indeed, since the ratio of coefficients is a 
polynomial  function  of  r ,  there  are  multiple  solutions  to  the  function,  but  nearly  every 
solution  is  imaginary  with  the  exception  of  a  single  real  root.  The  real  solution  to  the   13
polynomial is the value used for  r. The standard error of  r  is then obtained by simulation 
methods using the Krinsky-Robb procedure (Haab and McConnell 2003). 
The identification of the scale parameter, s , along with the coefficients,  b , g , and d  
is readily obtained once the rate of time preference r  is known.  Median willingness to pay is 
calculated from the estimates of the coefficients, b , at the mean of the independent variables, 
X .  The standard errors of the estimates of the parameters and the median willingness to pay 
are obtained by the Delta method (Greene 1997). 
 
IV. DATA 
The data for this analysis come from a stated preference question within a mail survey 
sent  to  single-family  dwellings  in  Portland,  Oregon  to  learn  about  the  quality  of  and 
recreation at regional parks in the city.  Portland has a population of about half a million 
people and is located in northern Oregon.  The impressive natural features of the city include 
two major rivers, the Willamette and Columbia, and roughly 10,000 acres of parks located in 
places along ridges, plateaus, and volcanic peaks. 
A random sample of 1,200 single-family dwellings selected from the 2001 Multnomah 
County Assessor's data was mailed a packet containing an eight-page survey, a cover letter, a 
map  of  the  Portland-area  highlighting  seven  regional  parks,  and  a  postage-paid  return 
envelope.  The earliest versions of the survey were shown to individuals with knowledge and 
expertise of Portland-area parks.
i  A focus group in Portland, three one-on-one sessions, and a 
pre-test of the survey were done to ensure that the questions were carefully worded and 
arranged.  Of the 1141 deliverable surveys, 42% (479) were returned, and 88% (420) of those 
surveys were useable in the analysis of the stated preference question. 
Before  reaching  the  stated  preference  question,  which  concerns  the  creation  of 
additional acreage for Powell Butte Park, a prominent regional park of Portland, the survey   14
asks questions about the quality and usage of the respondent's family of seven regional parks 
in Portland, including Powell Butte. These questions and the map of the Portland-area help 
the respondent to recall their experiences at Powell Butte.  Although homes line the northern 
side  of  Powell  Butte,  near  the  south-eastern  boundary  of  the  city,  Portland's  Parks  and 
Recreation Department is working to prevent additional development around the park.  Also, 
Portland has passed open space bond measures in the recent past, one in 1995, and another 
one in November 2006 (Metro 2006). 
The stated preference question initially describes the physical features and recreational 
opportunities Powell Butte currently offers, and a detailed map of Powell Butte is available 
for respondents to view.  The proposal for additional park land at Powell Butte is as follows: 
Several large parcels of land, totaling 100 acres, on the southeast side of Powell Butte 
eventually will be purchased by developers, rezoned, and used to construct new 
housing.  Alternatively, the City could purchase these lands and create an addition to 
Powell Butte Nature Park. Doing so would increase the size of the Park by 100 acres, 
or 18%. 
The payment vehicle described to the respondent is as follows: 
One way to pay for these costs of enlarging Powell Butte Nature Park is to add 
temporary surcharge (i.e., an additional payment) to the monthly water utility bills of 
ALL businesses and households in Portland. The temporary surcharge would be in 
effect for ______ months. 
The respondents were randomly assigned a payment schedule and a set of three bids 
values from four possible payment schedules, and, depending on the payment schedule, from 
a list of five sets of bid values shown in Table 1.
ii  The payment schedules differ in the length 
of time that the respondent makes payments for the public good, either 12 months, 48 
months, 84 months, or 120 months.  The first bid value in each set is the starting WTP bid for   15
the first question.  If the respondent's answer to first question is `yes', the respondent is 
offered the second bid value in the set, while a `no' response means that the third bid value is 
offered.
iii   
At the bottom of the WTP question, respondents with a zero WTP were asked why their 
WTP was zero. A respondent was presented with four options, ``I do not receive any benefits 
from having a larger Powell Butte Park.'', ``I cannot afford to pay anything at this time.'', ``It 
is unfair to ask people to pay more for parks.'', and ``Other (please list your reason)''. Several 
respondents put a check next to the ``Other...'' option.  Four wrote that water bills are too 
high, and one wrote that they did not like the water bill payment mechanism. The protest bids 
identified from this question about zero WTP were removed before conducting the analysis. 
Hypothetical bias may affect the results, even though respondents are likely familiar 
and comfortable with open space issues in Portland.  There is unfortunately no way to know 
in what direction the bias might exist unless there are unknown queues in the proposal for 
additional park land at Powell Butte.  Hypothetical bias is unlikely to affect the estimates of 
the discount rate (unless the proposal somehow indicates the additional park land has less 
value in the future) since the discounts rates are estimated through the payment schedules, 
and the payment schedules have minimal description that might send unknown queues to the 
respondent.          
The survey collects information in addition to the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
respondent useful for understanding the respondent's WTP for additional park land at Powell 
Butte.  The extra information includes whether  the respondent commutes, the number of 
hours the respondent works for pay in a week, whether the respondent intends to remain at 
that residence for the rest of their life, and the number of trips and average on-site time spent 
at Powell Butte.  Travel times and distances to Powell Butte from each respondent's residence 
were determined using network analyst in GIS.
iv  The respondent's perception of the hiking   16
quality and cleanliness of the grounds at Powell Butte were obtained from nine-scale Likert-
type questions. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample and population are shown in Table 2.  The sample 
has on average higher incomes and less family members, is more educated, and is more 
representative of females than the population.  The sample is evenly spread across the four 
payment schedules since roughly a quarter of the sample responds to each payment schedule. 
The large variation in the hours spent working for pay by the respondent is because many of 
the respondents are homemakers. 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We report the results from six models of willingness to pay responses. All models are 
estimated by random effects probit regressions except for the single bounded model that is 
estimated by a regular probit.  The naive double-bounded models (Double and Shift) do not 
control  for  anchoring,  and  framing  effects,  while  the  most  sophisticated  double-bounded 
model (Fram, Anch & Shift) controls for all the effects. 
In the estimation of the models, we pool the data from all the payment schedules.  The 
coefficient  on  the  bid  amount  should  differ  based  upon  the  payment  schedule  that  the 
respondent is answering since the annuity factor,  ( , ) i r T f , embedded in the coefficient, differs 
across  payment  schedules.  Dummy  variables  for  the  48,  84,  and  120  month  payment 
schedules interacted with the bid amount for those payment schedules allows the coefficient 
on the bid amount to differ across the payment schedules. 
Table 3 has the  coefficients  on the bid  amounts  for  each  of  the  payment schedule 
lengths for the WTP models.  Except for the single-bounded model, the coefficient on the 12 
month bid amount is negative and significant at the 5% level.  The insignificant coefficient on 
the 12 month bid amount for the single-bounded model makes us dubious of the value for the   17
discount rate we find for that model. In all the models, the coefficient on the bid amount for 
the 84 month payment schedules is more negative than the coefficient on the 12 month bid 
amount, with significance at the 5% level. 
For the naive double-bounded models, there is no significant difference between the bid 
amount coefficients on the 12 and 48 month payment schedules, but there is a significant 
difference between the bid amount coefficients on 48 and 84 month payment schedules at the 
10%  level.    For  the  more  sophisticated  double-bounded  models,  there  is  a  significant 
difference between the bid amount coefficients on 12 and 48 month payment schedules at the 
10% level, but there is no significant difference between the bid amount coefficients on the 
48 and 84 month payment schedules (except for the model, Anchoring & Shift).  In all the 
models, there is no significant difference between the bid amount coefficients on 84 and 120 
month payment schedules, suggesting respondents do not distinguish between the seven and 
ten year payment schedules when considering whether to support the proposal. 
The component of the error term attributable to individual effects,  r , ranges from 0.52 
to 0.73, where the lower values of  r  are found in the naive double-bounded models and the 
higher  values  of  r   are  found  in  the  models  controlling  for  framing  effects.    Although 
individual effects  have a  larger role  in the models controlling  for violations of  incentive 
compatibility, their presence is certain in all the double-bounded models. 
Table 4 has the findings of the annualized rate of time preference (discount rate) for the 
models of willingness to pay response.  The annualized discount rate is found using only the 
12 and 48 month payment schedules, the 12 and 84 month payment schedules, the 12 and 120 
month payment schedules, and all of the payment schedules. Other than the findings of the 
single-bounded  model,  the  discount  rate  is  the  largest  when  only  the  12  and  48  month 
payment schedules are used. 
An explanation for the higher discount rates when only the 12 and 48 month payment   18
schedules are used comes from the studies utilizing experiments to find discount rates. Thaler 
(1981) and Benizon et al. (1989) find in experiments of tradeoffs between a payoff now 
versus later that extending the wait time for a payoff later results in a lower discount rate for 
participants.  They  also  find  that  larger  payoffs  result  in  lower  discount  rates  for  the 
participants.  We  speculate  that  for  the  84  and  120  month  payment  schedules,  where  a 
substantial proportion of the payments occur far off in the future, the respondents make their 
choices with a lower discount in mind in line with the findings of the experimental studies. 
The  somewhat  lower  discount  rate  for  the  84  versus  120  month  payment  schedules  we 
attribute to the larger payments respondents see for the 84 month payment schedule. 
In all the models, the discount rate found using only the 12 and 84 month payment 
schedules or only the 12 and 120 month payment schedules is close to the discount rate found 
using all the payment schedules.  The discount rate for the single-bounded model is low at 
0.144, but this finding is questionable since the coefficient on the 12 month bid amount is not 
significant for the single-bounded model.  The discount rate for the naive double-bounded 
models is around 0.30 while the discount rate for the more sophisticated models is around 
0.35.  The distributions around the discount rates are corrected by trimming off the highest 
2.5% of values since there is significant skewness in the upper tail. The standard errors of 
around 0.25 shown in Table 4 come from the distributions corrected for skewness. 
With the discount rates found using all the payment schedules, estimates of the monthly 
WTP, scale, and follow-up question modifiers are shown in Table 5.  The log-likelihood 
statistic is the criterion for the comparison of the WTP models. Unlike the shift parameter, 
the anchoring parameter improves the fit of the model significantly over the naive double-
bounded model.  Assuming that the anchoring effect only occurs in the ascending sequence 
of the follow-up questions further improves the fit of the model suggesting that only the 
ascending sequence of follow-up questions is not incentive incompatibile.   19
The  monthly  WTP  ranges  from  near  3  for  single-bounded  and  the  naive  double-
bounded models to 4.5 for the models controlling for anchoring and framing effects. The 
more sophisticated double-bounded models have lower standard errors for monthly WTP 
although, in general, the standard errors across different random effects probit regressions are 
not possible to predict (Collett 1991). 
The  model  with  only  a  shift  effect  (Shift)  finds  that  the  shift  parameter  is  nearly 
significant, but the models with both anchoring and shift effects (Anchoring & Shift, and 
Fram,  Anch  &  Shift  )  find  an  insignificant  shift  parameter.  The  nearly  significant  shift 
parameter found in the model with only a shift effect is an artifact of the misspecification 
resulting from the exclusion of the anchoring parameter. 
For  all  the  models  with  an  anchoring  effect,  the anchoring parameter  is significant 
although small.  The anchoring parameter is small since the representation of the anchoring in 
the WTP model is not on the monthly bid amount shown in the CVM question, which would 
make  the  anchoring  parameter  larger,  but  on  the  full  bid  amount.  Comparing  the  WTP 
models, the anchoring parameter is larger if the WTP model only allows for the anchoring 
effect  in  the  ascending  sequence  of  the  follow-up questions.  The  argument  by  DeShazo 
(2002) that violations of incentive compatibility are only present in the ascending sequence of 
follow-up questions is consistent with that finding.  A WTP model, not shown in the tables, 
where  the  anchoring  effect  is  only  present  in  the  descending  sequence  of  the  follow-up 
questions results in an anchoring parameter that is insignificant. 
Tables 6 shows estimates of the coefficient vector  b , the scale s , the anchoring and 
shift parameters,  g  and  d , for four WTP models.  Aside from the single-bounded model 
shown for comparison, the three other WTP models chosen from the six models shown in 
Tables 3 to 6 are the models thought to best represent the WTP responses.  If the anchoring 
effect occurs in both the descending and ascending sequences of the follow-up questions,   20
then  Anchoring  &  Shift  is  the  appropriate  model  of  the  WTP  responses.  However, 
comparison of the WTP models by the log-likelihood criterion suggests that anchoring, for 
the most part, is only present in the ascending sequence of the WTP responses.  The model 
Framing  is  appropriate  if  the  anchoring  effect  is  significant  enough  that  the  ascending 
sequence of WTP responses offers no new information. However,  if the anchoring effect is 
weak, the model Fram, Anch & Shift keeps the information in the ascending sequence of 
WTP responses.  The standard errors of coefficient estimates are the lowest for the models 
Framing and Fram, Anch & Shift. 
As expected, the more education (EDU) and income (INC) a respondent has the more 
their WTP for additional public open space. Also, we find that the more hours worked in a 
week (WRKHRS) and the larger the size of the family (FAMSIZE) of the respondent the 
lower  their  WTP.  Since  the  additional  open  space  is  adjacent  to  Powell  Butte,  a  large 
wilderness park, the major beneficiaries of the additional open space are the main users of 
Powell Butte, outdoor enthusiasts. Outdoor enthusiasts are typically educated professionals 
without children whose main constraint on recreation is their amount of leisure time. 
Since  outdoor  enthusiasts  usually  spend  a  lot  of  time  on-site  at  wilderness  parks 
exploring the hiking trails, we find that on-site time (SITETIME) and the perception of the 
quality of the hiking trails (HIKING) increases WTP. The sign of the coefficient for the 
distance of the respondent's residence from Powell Butte (TRVLDIST) is the wrong sign but 
not  significant,  and  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  for  the  travel  time  to  Powell  Butte 
(TRVLTIME) is the expected sign but also not significant.  Since all the respondents live in 
the  Portland-area,  there  may  be  inadequate  variation  in  TRVLDIST  and  TRVLTIME  to 
obtain significant coefficients for those variables.   
The respondent's WTP is not sensitive to the length of the payment schedule since none 
of  the  coefficients  for  the  length  of  the  payment  schedule  (PAYSCHY4,    PAYSCHY7,    21
PAYSCHY10) are significant.  However, since the coefficients for the length of the payment 
schedule are strongly correlated to the coefficient on the bid amount, the omission of the 
binary  variables  for  the  length  of  the  payment  schedule  would  result  in  bias  of  all  the 
parameter estimates. 
Table 7 shows the sensitivity of the monthly WTP and the full WTP for additional park 
land at Powell Butte to the choice of discount rate.  The choice of the lower bound of the 
discount rate results in a lower monthly WTP but a higher full WTP, and the choice of the 
upper bound of the discount rate results in a higher monthly WTP but a lower full WTP.  The 
interval of the discount rate is wide enough that the 95% confidence intervals of either the 
monthly or full WTPs rarely overlap.  Comparing the WTP models, since the discount rate 
intervals are similar across models, the monthly and full WTP intervals are also similar.  The 
full WTP is the most sensitive to the choice of discount rate since the full WTP is the net 
present value of a stream of monthly WTPs.  If the median discount rate is chosen, the full 
WTP for an additional 100 acres of open space adjacent to Powell Butte is about $165 per 
household. 
With information already available on discount rates, a CVM question could ask the 
WTP for a month of benefits rather than the WTP for a long time horizon of benefits, since 
the former question is much less mentally cumbersome. Combining information on the WTP 
for a month of benefits and the discount rate easily allows for a determination of the WTP for 
a long time horizon, assuming the monthly WTP does not change over time. 
If the individual discount rate for public goods is much higher than the rates currently 
used in public investment decision making, the economic feasibility of a public investment is 
much more dependent on the ability to front-load the benefits of the public good rather than 
having most of the benefits received far off into the future. 
Table 8 shows the influence of demographic characteristics on the implicit discount   22
rate. We stratify the sample by a demographic characteristic and see what the discount rate 
for each stratified segment is.  The demographic characteristics examined are age, education, 
participation in an environmental organization, income, average number of work hours per 
week,  and  the  presence  of  children  14 or  younger  living  in  the  same  household  as  the 
respondent.
v  Since Fram, Anch & Shift is the WTP model with the best fit, we use that 
model for determining the implicit discount rate of the stratified samples. The number of 
observations in each of the stratified samples is shown in the last column of Table 8. 
A  comparison  of  the  discount  rates  across  the  stratified  samples  for  each  of  the 
demographic  characteristics  reveals  that  most  of  the  demographic  characteristics  do  not 
statistically  influence  the  discount  rate.  The  90%  confidence  intervals  for  discount  rates 
stratified by a given demographic characteristic (in particular, education, participation in an 
environmental organization, income, and average number of work hours per week) overlap 
significantly suggesting that the discount rates are not statistically different from each other. 
However, the age of the respondent and the presence of young children living in the 
same  household  as  the  respondent  do  appear  to  statistically  influence  the  discount  rate. 
Younger respondents have a lower discount rate than older respondents, and respondents with 
no  children  have  a  much  lower  discount  rate  than  respondents  with  children.    Selfish 
concerns unique to those demographics are a possible explanation for the findings.
vi   
Since older people are less likely to benefit from additional open space in the future 
than  younger people, due to the frailty of old age and the higher chance mortality, older 
people would be expected to higher discount rates.  Parents with young children want their 
children to enjoy  the benefits of open space before their children turn  into adults. Since 
parents of  young children benefit  less from open  space  in the distant  future than people 
without children, parents with  young children would be expected to have higher discount 
rates than people without children.   23
If the discount rate for public goods is dependent on demographics, public investment 
decision makers should pay attention to the demographics of the area where a public good is 




Our CVM study finds both individual discount rates and the WTP for additional open 
space.  Discount rates are found through variation across surveys in the length of the payment 
schedule for the public good, additional public open space; four different time frames are 
used.    Discount  rates  are  higher  if  the  shorter  time  frame  payment  schedules  are  used. 
Discount  rates  show  some  sensitivity  to  the  model  of  WTP  responses,  where  the  more 
sophisticated double-bounded models take into account shift, anchoring, and framing effects. 
If all the payment schedules are used for the more sophisticated models of WTP responses, 
discount rates of around 0.30 are found, similar to the rates found in revealed preference and 
experimental studies, and lower than the rates found in the prior CVM studies. 
The WTP component of the CVM question is for additional public open space adjacent 
to a prominent regional park in Portland, Oregon. We find the median WTP is $165 per 
household for an additional 100 acres of park land, much lower than $234 for a 5.5 acre 
parcel in Boulder (Breffle, Morey, and Loder 1998). We speculate that the lower WTP in our 
study  is  because  the  additional  land  is  adjacent  to  an  already  large  regional  park.  The 
significant  explanatory  factors  of  WTP  are  education,  income,  hours  worked  per  week, 
family size, amount of time spent at regional parks in Portland, and the perception of the 
hiking  trails  at  Powell  Butte.  Respondents  that  are  educated  outdoor  enthusiasts  are  the 
strongest supporters of open space preservation. 
The full WTP for a public good is shown to be sensitive to the assumption of the   24
discount rate. Additional research might investigate whether the stream of benefits is stable 
over time and whether every future benefit goes into the mental calculation that produces the 
full WTP. The discounts rates are stratified by demographics, and the discount rate is shown 
to be sensitive to age of the respondent and presence of young children living in the same 
household  as  the  respondent.  Additional  research  might  investigate  whether  other  public 
goods are sensitive to the same demographics or whether this finding is unique to public open 
space.  Also,  research  might  look  at  how  riskiness  (perceived  or  actual)  related  to  the 
provision of the public good influences the discount rate. 
Public investment decision makers need to consider how the benefits of a public good 
are provided over time, in particular how to front-load more of the benefits in light of the 
finding that individual discount rates are higher than market rates. Also, policy makers should 
know the demographics of the area where the public good is created while considering how 
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Endnotes 
                                                
i We thank Noelwah Netusil of Reed College, staff of the Metro's Regional Parks and Greenspaces Department, 
and staff of the Portland Parks and Recreation Department. 
ii The bids used in each payment schedule were designed so that the present value of payments is the same 
across all treatments. They are based in each case on the present results for mean and standard error of monthly 
willingness to pay, adjusted by the difference in the annuity factors between each treatment and the pretest. Thus 
the bids for shorter treatments are higher than those for longer treatments. 
iii The use of a follow-up WTP question is somewhat unusual for mail surveys, as it is more commonly used in 
telephone or in-person surveys. It is more accurately termed a random payment card approach, where the 
random variation in the category bounds helps mitigate concerns about framing effects that normally are 
expressed about payment card formats. (The explicit modeling of framing effects helps address this too.) 
Because the respondent can potentially see all three bids at once, it is analogous to asking a slightly more 
involved single bound WTP question. As the incentive compatibility properties of this format have not been 
studied carefully yet, some caution is needed in interpreting WTP estimates derived from it. 
iv We thank Shawn Bucholtz of the Economic Research Service of the USDA for help with this data. 
v The gender of the respondent was also considered, but the relatively low number of males that responded 
prevented estimation of the male segment of the sample. 
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TABLE 1 
 
Payment schedules and bid value sets for additional open space in the CVM questionnaire 
 
Bid value sets   Additional Open Space 
    Observations  yy  yn  ny  nn  yy%  yn%  ny%  nn% 
One year payment schedule                 
Set 1  (12,27,6)  19  2  6  3  8  10.5  31.6  15.8  42.1 
Set 2  (21,36,12)  17  2  2  4  9  11.8  11.8  23.5  52.9 
Set 3  (30,45,21)  21  3  2  6  10  14.3  9.5  28.6  47.6 
Set 4  (39,54,30)  23  1  6  3  13  4.3  26.1  13.0  56.5 
Set 5  (48,63,39)  12  2  0  1  9  16.7  0.0  8.3  75.0 
                     
Four year payment schedule                 
Set 1  (6,14,3)  30  5  11  5  9  16.7  36.7  16.7  30.0 
Set 2  (11,18,6)  17  3  1  6  7  17.6  5.9  35.3  41.2 
Set 3  (15,23,11)  20  2  4  4  10  10.0  20.0  20.0  50.0 
Set 4  (20,27,15)  17  2  1  3  11  11.8  5.9  17.6  64.7 
Set 5  (24,32,20)  24  4  2  1  17  16.7  8.3  4.2  70.8 
                     
Seven year payment schedule                 
Set 1  (5,11,2)  22  4  9  3  6  18.2  40.9  13.6  27.3 
Set 2  (8,14,5)  27  5  8  3  11  18.5  29.6  11.1  40.7 
Set 3  (12,18,8)  26  1  6  5  14  3.8  23.1  19.2  53.8 
Set 4  (16,22,12)  22  3  1  4  14  13.6  4.5  18.2  63.6 
Set 5  (19,25,16)  17  1  1  1  14  5.9  5.9  5.9  82.4 
                     
Ten year payment schedule                 
Set 1  (4,10,2)  22  2  10  4  6  9.1  45.5  18.2  27.3 
Set 2  (8,13,4)  32  6  8  4  14  18.8  25.0  12.5  43.8 
Set 3  (11,17,8)  6  2  1  0  3  33.3  16.7  0.0  50.0 
Set 4  (14,20,11)  18  1  2  4  11  5.6  11.1  22.2  61.1 
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TABLE 2 
 
Definitions and summary statistics of variables  
 







SEX  =1 if the respondent is male  0.35  --  0.49 
AGE  Age  40.43  10.27  37.2 
EDU  Years of schooling  16.81  2.45  14.26 
ENV  =1 if respondent has ever belonged to an 
environmental organization  0.61  --  -- 
INC  Annual family income  76184  44169  68305 
WRKHRS  Hours respondent spends working for pay per 
week  32.62  17.29  -- 
COMMUTE  =1 if respondent commutes to work at least 
one day a week  0.78  --  -- 
FAMSIZE  Size of family living in the same household 
as the respondent  2.55  1.27  3.14 
CHILD 
Number of children in the family age 
fourteen or younger living in the same 
household as the respondent 
0.61  0.93  0.42 
RESTIME  =1 if the respondent expects to stay in their 
current residence for the rest of their life  0.23  --  -- 
TRVLDIST  Distance to Powell Butte using major 
roadways (miles)  8.19  3.75  -- 
TRVLTIME  Travel time to Powell Butte using major 
roadways (minutes)  11.53  4.44  -- 
SITETIME 
The sum of the average on-site time spent per 
trip at five regional parks in the Portland-
area
b 
200.59  158.74  -- 
HIKING 
An index from 0 to 9 that measures the 
respondent's perception of the quality of 
Powell Butte's hiking trails 
6.9  1.18  -- 
CLEAN 
An index from 0 to 9 that measures the 
respondent's perception of the cleanliness of 
the grounds at Powell Butte 
8.05  1.65  -- 
PAYSCHY4  =1 if respondent bids with a payment 
schedule lasting 48 months  0.26  --  -- 
PAYSCHY7  =1 if respondent bids with a payment 
schedule lasting 84 months  0.27  --  -- 
PAYSCHY10  =1 if respondent bids with a payment 
schedule lasting 120 months  0.25  --  -- 
a  The total population of the Portland, Oregon is 524,944. The summary statistics of the population come 
from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2004 American Community Survey. 
b  The five regional parks are Forest Park, Mount Tabor Park, Tryon Creek State Park, Willamette Park,       
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TABLE 3 
 
Bid coefficient estimates for models of WTP 
 
  Bid Coefficients 
Model  One Year  Four Years  Seven Years  Ten Years 
         
Single  -0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.045 
     (0.019)** 
-0.105 
      (0.029)*** 
-0.078 
       (0.026)*** 
         
Double  -0.028 
     (0.015)** 
-0.059 




       (0.037)*** 
         
Shift  -0.028 
    (0.014)** 
-0.056 
     (0.025)** 
-0.114 
       (0.038)*** 
-0.106 
       (0.035)*** 
         
Anchoring & Shift  -0.045 
    (0.021)** 
-0.092 
     (0.037)** 
-0.163 
      (0.053)*** 
-0.141 
      (0.049)*** 
         
Framing  -0.049 
     (0.024)** 
-0.117 
       (0.045)*** 
-0.175 
      (0.062)*** 
-0.147 
      (0.056)*** 
         
Fram, Anch & Shift  -0.050 
     (0.026)** 
-0.230 
       (0.048)*** 
-0.179 
      (0.066)*** 
-0.148 
       (0.057)*** 
 Note: All models other than Single are estimated with random effects.  Standard errors in parentheses. *,**,***    
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TABLE 4 
 
Annual implicit discount rates determined from the bid coefficient estimates 
 
  Payment Schedules 
Model  One & Four Years  One & Seven 
Years  One & Ten Years  All Years 
         








         
Double  0.504 
    (0.513)** 
0.196 
  (0.241)* 
0.284 
      (0.214)*** 
0.294 
      (0.277)*** 
         
Shift  0.503 
   (0.501)** 
0.633 
  (0.519)* 
0.301 
     (0.273)*** 
0.303 
      (0.306)*** 
         
Anchoring & Shift  0.519 
   (0.501)** 
0.267 
      (0.228)*** 
0.375 
      (0.298)*** 
0.369 
      (0.247)*** 
         
Framing  0.714 
  (0.286)* 
0.268 
      (0.278)*** 
0.389 
      (0.355)*** 
0.337 
      (0.318)*** 
         
Fram, Anch & Shift  0.389 
  (0.485)* 
0.255 
    (0.262)** 
0.397 
      (0.319)*** 
0.354 
      (0.300)*** 
Note: All models other than Single are estimated with random effects.  Standard errors in parentheses. *,**,*** 
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TABLE 5 
 
Mean, scale, and follow-up question modifiers of monthly WTPs 
 
Model  m   s   g   d   r   LL 
             
Single  2.70 
(0.95)*** 
719.72 
(199.68)  --  --  0.144 
(0.266)  - 235.72 
             
Double  2.59 
(1.56)*** 
371.96 
(117.97)***  --  --  0.294 
(0.277)***  - 478.81 
             
Shift  3.17 
(1.37)** 
381.86 
(118.58)***  --  -1.44 
(1.15) 
0.303 
(0.306)***  - 477.9 
             









(0.25)***  - 468.1 
             
Framing  4.66 
(1.07)*** 
211.19 
(68.53)***  --  --  0.337 
(0.318)***  - 382.9 
             









(0.300)***  - 458.7 
Note: All models other than Single are estimated with random effects.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 6 
 
Parameter estimates for the explanatory factors of WTP for additional public open 
space 
 
Variables  Single  Anchoring &Shift  Framing  Fram, Anch, & Shift 
































































































































































g   --  0.012 
(0.005)**  --  0.039 
(0.012)*** 
d   --  2.222 











  Note: All models other than Single are estimated with random effects.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
   *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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TABLE 7 
 
Sensitivity of the monthly WTP, m , and the WTP, 
r/12
m
, to the assumption of the discount 
rate 
 
    Discount rate interval 
Model    2.5% Lower Bound  Median  2.5% Upper Bound 
         
Anchoring & Shift  r   0.146  0.369  1.063 
  m   2.876 
      (0.752)*** 
4.629 
       (1.192)*** 
6.413 






      (61.61)*** 
150.80 
      (38.82)*** 
72.06 
       (18.57)*** 
         
Framing  r   0.100  0.337  1.303 
  m   2.341 
      (0.554)*** 
4.655 
      (1.072)*** 
6.976 






     (66.39)*** 
166.27 
      (38.27)*** 
64.24 
      (15.19)*** 
         
Fram, Anch & Shift  r   0.115  0.354  1.305 
  m   2.641 
      (0.601)*** 
4.799 
       (1.058)*** 
7.121 






     (62.83)*** 
165.51 
      (36.52)*** 
65.51 
       (14.83)*** 
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 TABLE 8 
 
Implicit annual discount rates stratified by demographics 
 
Demographic characteristic  Discount 
Rate 
Standard 
Error  90% Confidence Interval  Observations 
           
All  0.354  0.300  0.167  0.832  840 
           
Younger than forty  0.078  0.264  -0.074  0.501  478 
Forty or older  0.790  0.564  0.447  1.761  362 
           
College education  0.187  0.356  -0.011  0.705  454 
Education beyond college  0.304  0.377  0.103  0.931  386 
           
Do not belong to enviro-organization  0.315  0.389  0.082  0.992  324 
Belong to enviro-organization  0.435  0.349  0.207  1.023  516 
           
Lower middle income  0.085  0.243  -0.081  0.482  378 
Upper middle income  0.483  0.462  0.224  1.297  372 
           
Work less than 40 hrs per week  0.299  0.155  0.177  0.562  326 
Work more than 40 hrs per week  0.302  0.148  0.186  0.547  514 
           
No children  -0.235  0.189  -0.367  0.061  520 
Have children  1.032  0.654  0.592  2.127  320 
 Note: Fram, Anch & Shift model is used to identify implicit discount rates. 
 
           
  
 
 
 
  
 